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SUMMARY 
Problems of economic reforms of centrally plannned economies 
are often related to the questions of price formation mechanisms. 
A decentralized competitive price formation would be desirable, 
but is usually considered infeasible because of monopolistic 
positions of many producers and because of deep disequilibria 
situations arising during a reform. The paper surveys known anti- 
monopolistic taxation, rewardor motivation mechanisms that make 
decentralized price formation possible. A new, robust mechanism 
of a price-dependent modification of the revenue function is 
proposed and analysed. While such mechanisms might work well in 
the short-term equilibrium case, they do not necessarily motivate 
a long-term equilibrium; strategic problems related to attaining 
long-term equilibrium are discussed. For the deep disequilibria 
case, another type of mechanisms is needed. A price-dependent 
modification of the profit function is shown to result in a robust 
motivation mechanism implementable for deep disequilibria (with- 
out market influence). Various aspects of implementability of 
motivation mechanisms are discussed in the paper; it is also shown 
that an introduction of another agent - a distributor with 
properly chosen motivation - might resolve many problems of anti- 
monopolistic motivation. 
IMPLEMENTABLE MOTIVATION MECHANISMS 
FOR MONOPOLY AND DEEP DISEQUILIBRIA 
Andrzej P. Wierzbicki 
1. THE PROBLEM 
Recent discussions on an economic reform in Poland stressed 
the importance of motivation mechanisms in decentralized planned 
economies; similar problems occur in Hungary and ~ugoslavia, in 
other planned economies, as well as in large corporations in 
market economies. 
The advantages of profit maximization motives have long been 
recognized in planned economies. The theoretical analysis of 
related issues has been started by the work of Lange in 1936 and 
continued by many researchers. (See Lange 1964,  Yunker 1 9 7 5 ) .  
Obviously, profit maximization and competitive price setting are 
socially desirable, if they are achieved by an efficiency increase; 
lowering costs, better resource utilization, better management, 
and if they result in a just distribution of profits or their use 
for socially needed investments. Not desirable is profit maxi- 
mization achieved by a monopolistic price increase and resulting 
in an unjust distribution. 
On the other hand, planned economies usually favour rather 
concentrated production. Many modern industries and services 
are characterized by increasing returns to scale, and the optimal 
production scale of a single producer is often comparable or 
higher than the possible demand range in a small economy, a 
typical case of natural monopoly. In this situation, the fear 
of a monopolistic price increase in one of the most important 
factors that prevent many planned economies from an introduction 
of decentralized price setting mechanisms. 
Traditionally, centralized planned economy is managed by 
central setting of production volumes. Prices are then deter- 
mined according to a mark-up rule, on the basis of average cost 
estimation with some reasonable profit rate. Clearly, such 
mechanism is often counter-efficient, it motivates cost increase, 
rather than decrease, and a guaranteed rate of profit does not 
stimulate better management or resources utilization. An 
alternative mechanism - a central setting of prices with pro- 
duction volumes determined by each producer through profit 
maximization* -is also not satisfactory. It requires large and 
precise information for price setting, leaves excuses for in- 
efficient producers, results in unreasonable excess profits for 
more efficient ones, etc. More advanced price-setting systems, 
as in Hungary, combine centrally set accounting rules for determ- 
ining prices with guideline prices from international markets; 
additionally antj.monopolistic imports can effectively limit price 
increases. However, such mechanisms might not necessarily work 
in deep disequilibrium situations, particularly if an economy is 
confronted with severe problems of the balance of trade. 
, -*  Such a central price setting has often been erroneously 
labelled as Lange solution; in fact, Lange solution is to set 
prices equal to marginal production costs and to minimize 
average production costs, but he did not specify central con- 
trol nor motivation mechanisms that would result in such a 
solution. In this sense, the paper is a continuation of Lange's 
original ideas. 
The basic monopolistic price limitation in a market econ- 
omy -the threat of entry of a competitor, if the monopolist does 
not control basic resources - requires a fast response from the 
capital market in order to be effective, and has never worked 
perfectly in a short-term; in particular it would not work in a 
deep disequilibrium situation. 
Recent theoretical developments for establishing competitive 
prices include many mechanisms such as incentive-compatible 
mechanisms - see, e.g., Kalai, Postlewaite and Roberts (1979), or 
bidding procedures for the rights to use common property re- 
sources, see, e.g. Young (1980). Kore related to problems of 
monopolistic production are the results of Weitzman (1974, 1978) 
and, in particular, antimonopolistic taxation or reward mechanisms 
as proposed by Domar (1974), Freixas (1980), Tam (1981 ). Such 
mechanisms consist of modifications of the profit function of the 
producer, introduced by central authority; the producer is free to 
set the price himself, but the mechanism induces him to set 
competitive price. Such mechanisms might be applicable for planned 
economies; in fact, many pragmatically, ad hoc devised motivation 
schemes has been applied in various planned economies. However, 
several problems arise in connection with the applicability of 
such mechanisms. 
First is the question of robustness of a mechanism, that 
is, the insensitivity of its results with respect to inevitable 
errors in setting the parameters of the mechanism by the central 
authority. This question has been,to some extent, analyzed by 
Weitzman (1 974, 1978) and Freixas (1 980) . In this paper, simple 
measures of robustness of such mechanisms are introduced and 
the robustness of the mechanisms of Domar, Freixas and Tam is 
compared; moreover, a new, more robust mechanism is introduced 
and analyzed. 
Second is the question of short-term versus long-term 
properties of such mechanisms. Clearly, the parameters of any 
such mechanisms should be kept constant by the central authority 
for a reasonable time, say, a year; they can be kept constant 
* that long if the mechanism is reasonably robust. However, both 
the control authority and the producers know that these para- 
meters will be finally changed. Will a producer be sufficiently 
motivated to invest and attain a long-term competitive price? 
Or will he rather enqage in a dynamic game with the planning 
authority? What type of the game can he play? Will he try to 
hide profits and take advantage of them? These and similar 
questions cannot be fully analysed in this paper, however, they 
cannot be bypassed, and a short discussion of them is thus 
presented. 
Third, most important for applications in Polish economy, 
is the question of application of such mechanisms in deep disequi- 
librium situation. By deep disequilibrium we understand here 
large production shortages (caused by inavailability of imported 
resources, inefficiencies and other reasons) resulting in a 
large gap between the demand and supply, rationing, etc. In 
such a situation, even competitive prices equilibrating the 
markets in a short term might be too high to be socially accept- 
able; reasons for market shortages have to be first removed 
before introducing competitive pricing. Thus, special motivation 
mechanisms are needed that would work even in the absence of a 
market and nevertheless stimulate efficiency and promote finally 
market equilibration. Neither of the previously analysed mech- 
anisms has the required properties to be applicable in a deep 
disequilibrium situation. A new mechanism is proposed, specially 
constructed for deep disequilibria. Its properties are analysed, 
both for the cases of single and multiple producers, and single 
and multiple products first in deep disequilibrium, then in the 
presence of a market. 
The above questions do not exhaust problems of applicability 
of motivation mechanisms: questions of central control of a 
disequilibrated economy and many others have also to be resolved. 
*Domar ( 1 9 7 4 )  and Tam ( 1 9 8 1 )  assume quite a number of 
parameter iterations before their mechanisms come close to 
competitive prices. This is not acceptable in practice - what 
has been, in fact, realised by both authors. Domar, being first 
to introduce this type of mechanism, concentrated more on basic 
ideas, while Tam devoted much attention to the speed of 
convergence of his mechanism. 
However, these questions are only shortly commented upon in the 
final part of the paper; it is shown that another agent, an 
appropriately motivated distributor, might resolve best the 
questions of long-term properties and robustness of motivation 
mechanisms for the producer. 
Although this paper has a theoretical character, the mathe- 
matical apparatus is kept to a necessary minimum, and the dis- 
cussionsof various aspects of implementability of motivation 
mechanisms are stressed instead. 
2. NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Following Domar (1974), we consider a simple description of 
a market for one commodity with many consumers, where the demand 
is described by a function 
where q - quantity, the demand volume, and p - the price. The 
function D is not necessarily derived from a utility maximization 
of a single consumer or consumer's group; however, we assume it 
to be twice differentiable, convex and strictly decreasing. The 
demand-price elasticity is denoted here as absolutely-valued: 
and is assumed to be strictly increasing with p, with lim E (p)< 1, 
P*O D - * lim E. (p) > 1. D 
P*=' 
* This assumption is known to be necessary for the existence of 
a normal monopolistic equilibrium. Not all typical demand models 
satisfy this assumption - neither those resulting from the Cobb- 
Douglas utility function, nor from linear expenditure systems, 
only the CES utility function with elasticity of substitution 
higher than 1 results in elasticity ED increasing to a number 
greater than 1. However, this assumption is not crucial - we are 
not that much interested in a normal monopolistic solution, we do 
not necessarily derive the demand from a single utility maximiza- 
tion and, finally, it might be argued that on a consumer market 
with subsistence levels (for basic needs commodities, typically 
described by linear expenditure systems) monopoly cannot hold at 
high prices, since consumers will eventually resort to self- 
provision. 
-1 The inverse demand p = D (q) is characterized, under above 
assumptions, by a convex, twice differentiable, strictly de- 
creasing function, with elasticity 1 / ~  (D-l (q) ) strictly increasing 
D 
with q. The monopolistic revenue is characterized by the function 
and the marginal revenue has the known form 
Similarly, we can write revenues and marginal revenues for several 
producers with assumed market shares, etc. 
However, we consider in the initial part of the paper only a 
single producer, whose total production costs are characterized by 
a function C(q), assumed to be twice differentiable, neither convex 
nor concave. In long-term, the long-term costs x ( q )  correspond to a 
typical case of natural monopoly, that is, LC (q, + q2) ( LC(ql) + LC (q2) ; 
however, as substantiated by the discussion in the introductory 
part, we are mostly interested in a short-term analysis. Thus, 
a typical characteristics of a locally convex average costs 
AC(q) = and the corresponding, also locally convex marginal 
d C 0  costs MC (q) = ---% are assumed. The normal monopolistic solution ds 
would be then de;ived by equating MR(q) = MC (q) . The competitive 
pricing solution is derived from p(q) = MC (q) and will be called 
A A 
'ideal' solution, denoted by p,q, although it corresponds only 
to a short-term efficient allocation of resources in this simple 
economy. 
3. MOTIVATION MECHANISMS FOR COMPETITIVE PRICE SETTING 
* 
Another agent in the economy - a central authority - is 
supposed to be able either to set centrally a production quota 
*We do not attach any ideological meaning to the notions of 
central authority or monopoly. The central authority might be a 
benevolent dictator, the monopoly might be natural - or all the 
consumers might form a cooperative in order to take advantage of 
increasing returns to production scale, elect a most able manager 
and give him a reward corresponding to a motivation mechanism 
selected by voting and on grounds of efficiency considerations. 
- - 
q, or a price p, or, by using taxation, subsidy, or rewards, to 
influence the motivation of the producer in such a way that he 
himself sets the price close to the ideal level. 
Observe that, if the elasticity cD is very high - say, 
E > 20 - the central authority might choose to leave the D 
producer maximizing his profit at the normal monopolistic sol- . 
ution. In fact, the price index: 
would not deviate then from the ideal value 1 more than 5.5% (we 
omit in further text the denotation of the dependence of functions 
on their arguments). The price index E- can be used to indirectly MC 
characterize the efficiency of a motivation mechanism. Clearly, 
for a given characteristics of production costs, if there were a 
uniform group of consumers characterized by a sufficiently smooth 
utility or benefit function that would have its maximum at = 1, MC 
then the loss af this benefit would be the smaller, the closer 
this index is to 1 . Weitzman (1 974) and Freixas (1 980) use 
direct, statistic estimations of consumers benefit losses to 
characterize the efficiency of motivation mechanisms. However, 
such direct estimations are difficult to obtain for more compli- 
cated motivation mechanisms, and are substantiated only if we 
assume that the demand is derived from the maximization of a 
single benefit functicn. For these reasons, we use here the more 
P simple, indirect index IT = - . MC 
If E~ > 20 and the central authority had chosen to set price 
- 
p, it would have to estimate MC at the ideal solution more accu- 
rately than up to 5.5% in order to obtain better results than at 
the normal monopolistic solution. If E~ > 20 and the central 
- 
authority had chosen to set production quota q, it would also 
* 
have to estimate 1IC in order to establish q. Assume that the 
estimate of q was initially correct and that MC has changed; 
*The same result can be obtained under the reverse assumption 
thatiqC does not change but an error in its estimation has been 
made, leading to an error in q and in the resulting index IT. There 
is no need, however, to perform this sensitivity analysis in order 
to get a result that can be obtained immediately from a much more 
simple and clearly equivalent reasoning. See Wierzbicki (1977) for 
a detailed discussion of relativity principles in sensitivity analysis. 
clearly, the central authority would again have to trace the 
changes of MC more accurately than up to 5.5% in order to obtain 
better results than at the normal monopolistic solution, at which 
no information for the central authority is needed. Thus, in the 
special case when the elasticity cD is very high, the normal 
monopolistic solution might be the best mechanism if the central 
authority does not have precise information. However, we are more 
interested in cases of much lower elasticity E~ and there are also 
other motivation mechanisms than the three compared above. 
We do not consider here the special mechanism of Weitzman 
(1978) in which the central authority sets prices and additionally 
penalizes for deviations from centrally set quantities. Although 
more robust than either centrally set prices or centrally set 
quantities, this mechanism has the same drawbacks as both previous 
mechanisms: too much information required, too few natural 
signals that transmit the information to the central authority. 
We are interested in more decentralized mechanisms, where the 
price-setting behaviour of the producer gives natural signals 
to the central authority. 
Domar ( 1 9 7 4 )  proposed a motivation mechanism that can be 
interpreted as follows. The reward for the producer should be 
proportional to the following modified profit* 
- 
where z is set by the central authority and is a guess of the 
D 
elasticity E~ at the ideal price. Although Domar proposes a 
* More precisely, PD should not be interpreted as modified 
profit, but only as a reward function, while the actual reward 
might be covered from a small part of traditionally defined 
profit. Practical applications of reward functions - for example, 
in Hungary - show that even if additional salaries dependent on 
such functions are only a very small part of traditionally de- 
fined profits, they are a very strong motivation - provided that 
they are shared between the managers and all staff of the pro- 
ducing enterprise, see further discussions. The distribution 
of the rest of traditionally defined profit and its use for 
investments requires different, long-term motivations. With all 
these reservations, however, we shall use here the term 'modified 
profit' for the sake of simplicity of interpretations. 
rather slowly converging iterative scheme to arrive at the right 
coefficient z, we shall assume that the central authority uses 
its best estimate of E~ and sets the coefficient z for a possibly 
long time, modifying it only when really necessary. We can easily 
derive the price index IT for this mechanism: 
Observe that this index deviates in a symmetrical way from 1  no 
matter whether FD was initially set incorrectly, or whether it was 
initially correct and then the actual E has changed; the same is D 
true also for other indices that characterize deviations from 
optirnality, but usually in a linear approximation sense. The 
* * following robustness coefficient of this index can be considered: 
h 
where E is the elasticity at the ideal solution. Thus, the D h 
mechanism is robust only if E is reasonably large. For example, D 
if we would like to have deviating from 1  by no more than 5 % ,  
h h 
and if E~ > 5, we would have to estimate E~ up to 2 0 1  accuracy, 
h 
a reasonable requirement. However, if E~ < 2, we have to estimate 
it with a higher accuracy than the resulting accuracy of IT. 
h 
Moreover, the mechanism does not work if E~ - < 1 .  
Guesnerie and Laffont ( 1 9 7 8 )  and Freixas ( 1 9 8 0 )  considered 
'linear taxation mechanisms' that can be interpreted as the 
maximization of the following modified profit: 
**Actually, it is an 'unrobustness' coefficient, the mechanism 
is robust if this coefficient is small. 
where E and are estimates of the elasticity cD and marginal D * 
cost MC at the ideal solution. The corresponding price index 
is 
E - 
p - D t 
M C -  E D -  1 *(I - - )  = I T  MC F 
- 
and, after estimating the dependence of MC on t, we obtain the 
robustness coefficient 
u L 
where C" = -'see Appendix 1. Since ETED = -1, E~~~ = 1, we dq2 - 
% I *.-. I have E I T ~ E ~  A and E I T ~ ~ ~  A . Thus, the linear 
En - 1 E, - 1 
U U 
taxation mechanism has similar robustness as the Domar mechanism- 
- 
actually, it is slightly less robust, since errors in E~ and 
- 
- 
:C might accumulate . The linear taxation mechanism is applicable 
A 
even if E < 1, although it is very bad if ;D 1, and not really 
D A -- 
robust for cD < 2, since we have then to estimate E with a higher 
accuracy than the resulting accuracy of IT. 
Tam (1981) considers a mechanism that is equivalent to the 
maximization of the following modified profit: 
* Observe that if PF would indeed be interpreted as a modified 
profit after 'taxation' (in this case, after subsidy to the 
producer), we would obtain a contradiction: in order to prevent 
a monopolistic producer from charging monopolistic prices and 
earning monopolistic profits, we give him a subsidy that brings 
his profit again to monopolistic magnitude. However, PF can be 
legitimately interpreted as a reward function. Another reser- 
vation to such a mechanism is that once we start to modify 
prices by taxation or use prices an an element of taxation, we 
have to go to very detailed commodity classications and the 
problems of aggregating prices might be severe, see also Domar 
(1974). These problems will be investigated in further sections. 
* 
where 4 is an estimate of the ideal production quantity. Thus, 
Tam mechanism is a relaxed way of setting production quotas. 
The price index IT can be obtained as: 
and, after estimating the dependence of q on 4, we obtain the 
robustness coefficient (see Appendix 1) 
If the quantity q is estimated from MC and by a simplified D 
demand formula with constant elasticity, then we can show that 
- 
h 
E - - -  E = 0. Thus, EITTMC 1 QMC D, QED z,~ITT&D = 0. This can 
be interpreted that the Tam mechanism is approximately twice more 
robust than the central quantity setting: to guarantee deviations 
of no more than 5% from the ideal nT = 1, we have to estimate the 
production cost MC up to 10% accuracy. Moreover, Tam mechanism 
works even for 2 < 1. D 
However, all these robustness estimates are not really 
satisfactory. To obtain a really implementable mechanism, we 
sbuldlike to have deviations of IT of no more than 5% for errors 
in parameters - such as or MC - up to at least 20%, and this D A ., 
for a broad range of elasticities E including E < 1. D' D 
* *  The reward function PT has a serious drawback, not shared with 
the functions PD or PF: the maximization of PT does not necessarily 
promote market equilibration. We should remember that the market 
constraint, for a monopolistjc producer, has an inequality form, 
p ~p (q) = D-l (q) . Thus, if q is too large and (4) < MC (q) , we 
have aPT/aq < 0 ,  q should be smaller than 4; but then aPT/ap < 0, 
p should be decreased. In this situation, the monopolistic pro- 
ducer is simply motivated to stop producing. Thus, the robustness 
coefficients derived here apply fully only for q < $; for 4 > $ they 
might be applicable only under additional reasonsto produce 
(survival motivation) . 
This can be achieved by observing, first, that the knowledge 
A A 
either of the ideal E~ or of the ideal MC would suffice for 
obtaining n = 1. Thus, a good mechanism should have the first 
A 
derivatives of 'IT with respect to E equal zero at FD = E 
A D' D ' 
= MC. To derive such a mechanism, we can postulate that the 
coefficient z in Domar mechanism (6) be dependent not only on 
- 
E but also on the ratio P/-, where p is the actual price D' p- 
charged by the producer, and p = ?% is an estimate of the marginal 
* 
cost at the ideal solution. Thus, the modified profit is : 
and the price index T takes the form (see Appendix 2) 
p - 
- = 'IT 
dz & = - ' E  
CM z - ( E ~  - 1 + E ~ )  W ' Z dp z (1 6) 
We assume here E > 0, the coefficient z diminishes with increasing z 
p. To obtain the required properties of the mechanism, we 
postulate: 
These requirements result also in & = 1, and z - 
* Again, the maximization of PW does not promote market equili- 
brium, although this drawback is less serious than in the case of 
PT. In fact, it is easy to show (Appendix 2) - that if 5 < 6 ,  then 
the producer could maximize PW by choosing p = p = ~ ~ ( q )  with 
q <G=D(@), while not satisfying market demand. However, we 
assume here for simplicity sake that there are other motivations 
that push the producer towards satisfying market demand. Never- 
theless, this drawback is a serious flaw on the implementability 
of the PW motivation mechanism. 
can be solved as a differential equation (see Appendix 2) to obtain: 
When computing derivatives of  IT^ we obtain, as expected 
= 0. Moreover, 
- 
P/; = 1 E = ED, P/p = 1 D 
also the second derivatives are obviously zero, and only the mixed 
- 
aerivative aL'~ f 0.  Thus, the robustness coefficient can be 
defined as: 
A A A 
It follows that, indeed, if we estimate cD and CM = p up to 
20% accuracy, we obtain deviations of n of approximately 4% ; 
A A A w 
if the estimates of cD and CM = p would be only 30% accurate. 
we still obtain deviations of nW of only about 9%. For larger 
deviations the approximation of n by the robustness coefficient W 
(20) is less accurate (see examples of computations of the 
results of this mechanism in Appendix 2). 
It remains to comment on the possibility of iterative 
h h 
estimation 6 t+l of CM = p, provided the mechanism has been used 
- 
with some pt, SDt and, as a result, some actual pt as well as 
z and E have been observed. We assume that we know €[cDmin; t Z t 
- 
E € Dmax I , and also cD E [ E ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  Drnax I, thus we do not change 
- - - 
E C Dl 'D,t+l = E Dt' If the expected changes of p were so small that 
the marginal costs MC could be considered constant, we would 
immediately estimate 
1 13 zt (1 - (1 - E  1 )  t i f > < l * E  < 1 
Pt Dmin Zt Pt Zt 
(21 1 
1 Pt > I * &  > 1 
p, E Zt Z t ( 1 - E  1 )  i f G  Dmax 
1 
- 
E ( 1 Dmax 
1 
- 
E (1 Dmin 
MC 
If ( )  < 1 , then pt has to be decreased conservatively, to obtain 
- Pt max 
- MC 
%+l - MCmax: if > 1. then it has to be increased, to pt min 
- 
- 
- MCmin. If 1 E [(-) MC MC 
Pt+l - ; ( 1, then there is not enough 
Pt 
min p .max 
t 
- - 
- information for taking action, pt+l - pt. For example (taken from 
the results in Appendix 2), suppose we know that E €[0.4;0.6] 
- 
D 
and have chosen E = 0.5, pt = 1. The mechanism resulted in D 
Pt = 1.31 6 (because actual MC = 1.4, E~ = 0.4, but we do not 
know that) and in zt = 0.743, E = 1.172. We obtain then Zt - 
MCmin = 1.257, PICmax = 1.400, and thus increase pt+l = 1.257, 
which results in pt+l = 1.368, within 3% accuracy of actual 
marginal costs. 
If we cannot assume constant marginal costs MC, we can 
still estimate new ct+l, provided we know either the second 
d 2 ~  C tt A derivative C" = - , or marginal cost elasticity ECl = q, 
dq2 
or some bounds for them (see Appendix 2). 
Summarizing the properties of the new proposed motivation 
mechanism - the modified notion of profit (15), (18) - we see 
that it is robust, requires only a very small number of 
- 
iterative changes of 5 = CM and some approximate knowledge 
of E ~ .  It works also for E~ < 1, in fact, even if E~ " 0 or 
even in deep disequilibrium conditions, when the constraint (1) 
does not apply (in both these cases it is easy to show that this 
mechanism becomes equivalent to the central price setting). 
However, it has a fairly complicated form, which might be con- 
* 
sidered as a disadvantage. 
4. SHORT-TERM VERSUS LONG-TERM PROPERTIES OF MOTIVATION 
MECHANISMS 
In the long-term relation between the producer and the 
central authority, the former will undoubtedly play a game, and 
the latter .would be forced to take this into account. Such a 
game can be described formally as a metagame, or hierarchical 
game (see Germeer 1976); the central authority could choose its 
strategy from a class of profit modification functions, this 
*On the other hand, many ad hoc constructed motivation 
mechanisms in planned economies have even more complicated forms - 
although they are usually applied as an augmentation of the central 
quantity setting mechanism. This does not mean that the proposed 
mechanism is suggested here as the best implementable one - it does 
not promote market equilibrium, nor does it perform satisfactorily 
in long term and deep disequilibria cases. 
class can be formalized and axiomatically described, the best 
function from this class could be chosen - probably in a much 
more complicated form, than the relatively simple function (15), 
(18). However, this is not the purpose of this paper. For the 
sake of implementability of motivation mechanisms, much more 
important is to analyze the feasibility of various strategies of 
players - particularly those of the producer. 
First strategy that might occur to the producer is that to 
be rewarded independently of the centrally set reward mechanism - 
by hiding profits in costs and using them for his own benefit. 
A private producer might do so, but also he has some limits, 
since it is necessary to show profit to the stockholders. In 
decentralized planned economies, the institutional solution 
that prevents the manager from enjoying 'representation costs' 
is relatively simple: the reward is shared by the manager and 
all workers in the factory in the form of a thirteenth and 
fourteenth salary. If the manager hides profits in costs and 
diminishes the additional reward to the workers, he will soon be 
in trouble. * 
The second strategy that might occur to the producer is not 
to hide profits, but simply not to maximize the modified profits 
or reward functions, for example by charging prices higher than 
the marginal, simulating higher costs, even if the central authority 
has correctly set the parameters of the motivation mechanism. This 
is similar to the known strategy of hiding production capacities 
in the quantity-setting mechanism when the manager, rewarded for 
a production increase from year to year, always tries to have some 
hidden reserves. However, in the latter case, there is usually no 
penalty for hiding capacities, while under a modified profit moti- 
vation mechanism, the producer must consciouslyforegorewards. He 
* Naturally, this institutional solution has some limits: if the 
profits are very large, the workers might agree to building a new 
holiday home for the factory (or sometimes even for the manager) 
charging it to production costs. Thus, excessive profits are 
socially undesirable - even if the marginal pricing would suggest 
them as Pareto-optimal. 
risks that the central authority will not change the parameters 
of the motivation mechanism next year, and the reward will be 
foregone without long-term effects. Again, the institutional 
solution of sharing the rewards with workers makes it very 
difficult for a manager to apply this strategy - provided that 
the profit is not excessive. 
A strategy that might successfully be applied by a mono- 
polistic producer under modified profit motivation is not to 
invest, or fake investments (that is, invest in production of 
essentially different commodities), particularly if the demand 
elasticity E is low. In such a case, he cannot increase D 
the quantity sold-he would have to sell at r?.uch lower prices. 
If he presently has a slightly smaller capacity and sells at 
much higher short-term marginal costs, why should he forego 
future profits and invest, when there is no competition forcing 
him to do so? However, he might have some other motivation for 
investments: a belief that some investments are needed for the 
survival of the firm, or he might be conditioned to invest by a 
long experience of management in the traditional system of cen- 
trally set production quota. The central authority can try to 
persuade him to invest by announcing new parameters of the moti- 
vation mechanism (reward function) for a few years ahead. How- 
ever, short-term motivation mechanisms do not naturally stimulate 
the desirable investment behavior of a monopolistic producer 
that would result in the long-term competitive equilibrium.* 
Thus, if a traditional planned economy managed by production 
quota is reformed and a decentralized price setting together with 
appropriate motivation mechanisms is introduced instead, we can 
expect an abrupt decrease of the demand for investments. This 
phenomenon has been observed in Hungary and should be judged 
positively, since the unrestricted demand for investments observed 
* Theoretically, we could set the parameters of the motivation 
mechanisms in such a way that they will correspond to the esti- 
mated long-term competitive equilibrium, and stop to bother about 
the time-path and investments that are necessary to achieve this 
equilibrium. This, however, is a purely static approach that 
cannot be applied in practice: the producer would probably stop 
the production completely and argue that the estimated long- 
term equilibrium is infeasible, etc. - 
under  a  c e n t r a l  s e t t i n g  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  q u o t a  i s  a  ma jo r  f a c t o r  
t h a t  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  development  c y c l e s  o f  p lanned  economies.  
However, a  p r o p e r  m o t i v i a t i o n  mechanism f o r  i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  mono- 
p o l i s t i c  p r o d u c t i o n  i s  a d i f f i c u l t  problem. S i n c e  t h i s  problem 
i s  r e l a t e d  a l s o  t o  m o t i v a t i o n  mechanisms f o r  marke t  e q u i l i b r a t i o n ,  
it w i l l  b e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n .  
5. MOTIVATION MECHANISMS FOR DEEP DISEQUILIBRIA 
By a  deep  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  w e  u n d e r s t a n d  h e r e  a c a s e  where 
t h e r e  i s  a  l a r g e  s h o r t a g e  o f  s u p p l y ,  r e s u l t i n g  i n  queu ing  o r  
even r a t i o n i n g ,  and  t h e  marke t  d o e s  n o t  work p r o p e r l y .  Such a  
s i t u a t i o n  migh t  b e  c a u s e d  by a m i s f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  
q u a n t i t y  s e t t i n g  mechanism accompanied by a  c e n t r a l  p r i c e  s e t t i n g  
o r  mark-up r u l e s  f o r  p r i c e  s e t t i n g .  T y p i c a l l y ,  p r o d u c e r s  i n  
s u c h  a s i t i a t i o n  have  h idden  p r o d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t i e s  - t h e y  have  
i n v e s t e d  h e a v i l y ,  b u t  d i d  n o t  u t i l i z e  t h e  i n v e s t m e n t s  - and 
c u r r e n t  p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t s  are d i s t o r t e d  by mismanagement, m a t e r i a l  
i n p u t  c o n s t r a i n t s  and i n e f f i c i e n t  u s e  o f  b a s i c  r e s o u r c e s .  When 
t r y i n g  t o  r e f o r m  such  a n  economy t h r o u g h  i n t r o d u c i n g  d e c e n t r a l -  
i z a t i o n ,  a  f u l l y  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  c o m p e t i t i v e  p r i c e  s e t t i n g  i s  n o t  
a  f e a s i b l e  s o l u t i o n .  The r e a s o n  i s  n o t  o n l y  t h a t  many p r o d u c e r s  
migh t  have  m o n o p o l i s t i c  p o s i t i o n s ,  b u t  a l s o  t h a t  t h e  s h o r t - t e r m  
e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e s ,  due  t o  the dis tor t ions o f  c o s t s ,  migh t  b e  s e v e r a l  
t i m e s  h i g h e r  t h a n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c e n t r a l l y  se t  p r i c e s .  When t r y i n g  
t o  e q u i l i b r a t e  t h e  economy by t h e  way o f  s h o r t - t e r m  e q u i l i b r i a ,  
wage g u a r a n t e e s  and monetary e f f e c t s  migh t  r e s u l t  i n  a v e r y  h i g h  
i n f l a t i o n .  Thus,  a  more d e s i r a b l e  p a t h  towards  long- term 
e q u i l i b r i u m  migh t  l e a d  o r i g i n a l l y  t h r o u g h  deep  d i s e q u i l i b r i a ,  
and t h e  f i r s t  s t e p  on t h i s  p a t h  is  t o  i n t r o d u c e  m o t i v a t i o n  
mechanisms t h a t  would r e s u l t  i n  a b e t t e r  u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  h idden  
p r o d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t i e s ,  b a s i c  r e s o u r c e s  and i n  removing m a t e r i a l  
c o n s t r a i n t s .  
Sharp  c e n t r a l  p r i c e  s e t t i n g  w i t h o u t  q u a n t i t y  s e t t i n g  i s  n o t  
a n  implementable  mechanism i n  such  a  s i t u a t i o n ,  n o t  o n l y  because  
t h e  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  d o e s  n o t  have a l l  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  
but also since sharp central price setting has some very undesir- 
able effects in deep disequilibria. For example, if there are 
several producers of the same commodity with widely different 
production costs, as in the case of chemical fertilizer production 
in Poland, a centrally set price leads either to excessive profits 
of the most efficient producers, or to an instant bankruptcy of 
the least efficient one. The bankruptcy is not admissible, since 
there are market shortages, and the least efficient producer should 
be subsidized until other producers expand their production; thus, 
the prices should be differentiated in deep disequilibria. 
A l t h o u g h  i t  m i g h t  seem t o  be  i n c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  c l a s s i c a l  
economic  i n t u i t i o n ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  c o n s t r u c t  mechanisms t h a t  
l e a v e  p r i c e  d e c i s i o n s  t o  t h e  p r o d u c e r s ,  m o t i v a t e  t hem  t o  s e t  
m a r g i n a l  p r i c e s ,  t o  u s e  f u l l y  t h e i r  c a p a c i t i e s  and t o  d e c r e a s e  
c o s t s ,  and a t  t h e  same t i m e  a l l o w  f o r  c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  
p r i c e  range  - even without the influence of the market, in deep 
disequilibrium, where the producer could theoretically choose 
any price and quantity. In order to construct such a mechanism, 
we utilize the idea of price-dependent modification - however, 
not of the revenue function, as in the modified Domar mechanism 
(which is equivalent in deep disequilibrium to central price 
setting and thus not satisfactory) but of the entire profit. 
Consider the following modified profit 
and suppose (1) is not binding, q # D(p).* The function a can 
be any sufficiently strongly decreasing function of p, however, 
for the purpose of an easy implementation, it is assumed that 
this function has the form given in Fig. 1, and is defined by an 
upper and a lower guideline price. 
* Observe that this is a stronger assumption than simply letting 
cD-tO, which would correspond only to a constant demand q inde- 
pendent of price p, but still binding the producer. 
Figure 1.  Function a in a price-dependent profit taxntion mechanism 
and its elasticity €A, where fi -upper guideline price, 
- 
p = ye - lower guideline price (y < 1 )  , a, - part of untaxed 
- profit staying with the producer for low prices, c A = X  - 
the increment of at its discontinuity at p = p .  I -Y 
If the producer maximizes PA and chooses independently p 
and q, his solution will result from two equations (see Appendix 
3) : 
These two simple equations indicate that the producer, when 
maximizing PA, even in deep disequilibria behaves reasonably: 
he chooses the marginal price p = M C  and his produced quantity 
is such that AC<MC, - that is, he is motivated to produce not 
less than his optimal cost capacity (defined classically as the 
produced quantity q such that ACmin = AC = MC). Moreover, if 
his capacity is orginally hidden or distorted, he is motived to 
extend this capacity by better management and better resource 
utilization - since, clearly, any extension of q at constant C, 
p will increase PA. How much precisely he will exceed his 
optimal cost capacity depends on the elasticity €A - that is, 
on the parameters of the taxation mechanism. 
The p a r t i c u l a r  t a x a t i o n  mechanism proposed i n  Fig .1  ha s  a  
r a t h e r  s imple  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  The c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  l e t s  t h e  
p roducer  choose any p r i c e  he wishes ;  b u t ,  i f  he  exceeds  t h e  
upper g u i d e l i n e s  p r i c e  5, a l l  h i s  p r o f i t  i s  t a x e d  away. Thus, 
i f  h i s  average  c o s t s  AC a r e  h i g h e r  t h a n  5 f o r  a l l  q ,  he might  
choose p  = ACmin > 5 and t h u s  cover  t h e  p roduc t i on  c o s t s ,  b u t  
he i s  n o t  mot iva ted  t o  go h i g h e r  w i t h  t h e  p r i c e  - he w i l l  n o t  
o b t a i n  any p r o f i t . *  I f  he  can d e c r e a s e  ACmin below 5, he w i l l  
c e r t a i n l y  do s o  i n  o r d e r  t o  o b t a i n  some p o s i t i v e  P A ,  and charge  
some p r i c e  p=MC > ACmin, p < g .  However, a s  long  a s  p  i s  c l o s e  
t o  5, a  l a r g e  p a r t  o f  h i s  p r o f i t  i s  t axed  away, and he i s  moti-  
v a t e d  t o  f u r t h e r  d e c r e a s e  ACmin i f  o n l y  p o s s i b l e .  F i r s t  
when he can d e c r e a s e  h i s  c o s t s  ve ry  f a r  below t h e  lower g u i d e l i n e  
l e v e l  ( approx imate ly ,  i f  AC < ( 2y - I )$  - s e e  Appendix 3 ) ,  he 
- 
min - 
chooses  p = p  = y5 which g i v e s  him t h e  maximal p a r t  a. of h i s  
p r o f i t  remaining a f t e r  t a x a t i o n .  
The pa ramete r  a. does  n o t  r e a l l y  a f f e c t  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  
t a x a t i o n  mechanism and can be chosen from o t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
( a t  some r e a s o n a b l e  l e v e l ,  s ay  a  = 0.5 0 .8)  . The paramete r  0  
y  i s  i m po r t an t  and e x p r e s s e s  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  of t h e  c e n t r a l  
a u t h o r i t y  ab o u t  p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t s ;  i n  t h e  i n i t i a l  phase  o f  a re- 
**  
form, t h e  use  of y  = 0.6 o r  even y  = 0.5  i s  sugges t ed .  The 
* Mathemat ica l ly ,  t h e  p r i c e  i s  n o t  w e l l  d e f i n e d  i n  such  a  c a s e ,  
s i n c e  t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  cA, wh i l e  approach ing  i n f i n i t y  i f  p  i n c r e a s e s  
t o  5, c e a s e s  t o  e x i s t  f o r  p  > g .  However, i f  a  p roducer  has  no u s e  
f o r  f u r t h e r p r i c e  i n c r e a s e s , h e  w i l l  n o t  charge  l a r g e r  p r i c e s  - i f  
o n l y  i n  o r d e r  t o  show t h a t  he i s  n o t  a n t i s o c i a l .  Also ,  it cou ld  
be j u s t  l e g a l l y  p r o h i b i t e d  t o  charge  p  > A C  i f  p > e .  Thus, w e  
i n t e r p r e t  h e r e  PA n o t  o n l y  a s  a  reward f u n c t i o n  - a l t hough  it i s  
a  reward f u n c t i o n ,  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  s a l a r i e s  o f  t h e  e n t i r e  s t a f f  o f  
t h e  p roducer  shou ld  be  dependent  on PA - b u t  a l s o  a s  an  a c t u a l l y  
modi f i ed  p r o f i t .  The remaining p a r t  of  t h e  a c t u a l  p r o f i t  i s  
c o l l e c t e d  by c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  and might  be used t o  s t i m u l a t e  
inves tment  behav iour  o f  t h e  p roducer .  
* *  A s  i n d i c a t e d  above,  t h e  p roducer  w i l l  choose a  p r i c e  p  i n  
t h e  range  5 = ye ,$ ,  i f  h i s  minimal ave r age  c o s t s  ACmin a r e  i n  
1 - - t h e  r a n q e  (2y-1) p  = 2-V)p,p.  Thus, even i f  t h e  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  
has  r a t h e r  poor i n f o r m a t i o n  abou t  c o s t s  and assumes t h a t  t h e y  
can change 5 t i m e s ,  it can choose 2y-1(1/5 ,  f o r  example y  = 0.6 ,  
and l i m i t  t h e  p r i c e  range  t o  0 .65 ,6 ,  which cor responds  t o  o n l y  
+ 25% p r i c e  changes from t h e  midd lepo in t  0.85. 
-
parameter 6 - the upper guideline price - is then a basic para- 
meter by which the central authority influences the producer 
behavior, the choice of produced quantity q and the corresponding 
price p =MC(q). However, large changes of 5 are not the best 
strategy of the central authority in the long-term (and they are 
not really needed, since the admissible initial uncertainty range 
of the central authority is conveniently large). 
This is illustrated by the examples in Fig.2 arb and c 
indicating possible equilibrating strategies of the central 
authority. First stage is the disclosure of the actual capacity 
and production costs by the producer, motivated by the mechanism 
of maximizing PA. Initially, the cost curves of the producer 
were distorted by mismanagement and hidden capacities, see curves 
ACD and MCD in Fig.2a. Suspecting large hidden reserves, the 
central authority might choose 6 on the level of recently re- 
ported production costs.* The producer chooses a produced 
quantity q and price pD resulting from the interesection of the D 
1 curves ACD and MCD (1 -r). He finds that his best price PD 
P is very close to @ and hls taxed profit PA is very low, and he 
starts to complain to the central authority that @ has been 
wrongly chosen. Here the central authority must be obstinate 
and announce that next year @ will not be changed and that the 
producer should cope with the problem on his own. At this point, 
the producer mobilizes his hidden reserves, improves management, 
and finds that his actual cost curves are AC and MC; he can in- 
crease produced quantity to qS, lower the price to pS, and have 
a respectable profit even after taxation. 
The increased quantity qS might be sufficient or not for 
market equilibration. If the point pSlqS, is already above an 
-1 
estimated demand curve p =  D (q), Fig.2bI then the central author- 
ity can terminate rationing of the produced commodity p r o v i d e d  
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  some o t h e r  mechanism o f  m a r k e t  e q u i l i b r a t i o n  t h a t  
w i l l  push  t h e  p r o d u c e r  t o  s a t i s f y  a c t u a l  demand e v e n  i f  t h e  d e -  
mand i n c r e a s e s ;  such mechanisms will be discussed later. 
- 
* Say, 5 %  higher in order to give some motivation for the pro- 
ducer; if the producer is known for highefficiencyand his hidden 
reserves are not too large, then even up to 20% higher. 
Figure 2. Equilibration under price-dependent profit taxation: 
a) initial phase, disclosure of true costs and capac- 
ities; b) equilibration without investment; c) equili- 
bration through investments. 
Since the initial marginal cost curve MCD was distorted, 
the proposed strategy of market equilibration is clearly dominant 
over 'pure market' strategy that would allow the producer to go 
-1 first to the price pF on the intersection of MCD and p = D  (q). 
If it is perceived that an investment is needed for market 
equilibration, Fig.Zc, and that an increase of production scale 
might decrease the costs, the central authority might choose one 
of several strategies. 
It can increase the upper guideline price @, let the pro- 
ducer increase his production and price, terminate rationing and 
apply some market-equilibration mechanism. This would result in 
a solution close to pE, qE, a short-term equilibrium. At this 
point, the producer could increase his modified profit PA through 
an investment, if @ were kept constant, but he fears that @ will 
again be lowered - and might choose to forego uncertain profits 
and keep to certain, already large profits, by not investing. 
Even if the central authority succeeds in convincing him to invest, 
the price 6 would indeed have to be lowered again, and it is 
questionable whether this way to a long-term equilibrium through 
short-term equilibria with price varying up and down is really 
desirable from a social point of view. 
Another alternative for the central authority is to continue 
rationing for a slightly longer time, and announce long-term 
guideline prices (for example, not changing them). Then the 
producer has an incentive to invest. However, if he is a mono- 
polist, his best investment might be on a lower scale than re- 
quired in order to bring the market to a long-term equilibrium, 
to the point pLE, qLE in Fig.2~. If the investments are centrally 
coordinated and short-term cost curves after investments are AC2, 
MC2, then the monopolistic producer will be forced, when maxi- 
mizing modified profit PA, to choose a price pp and quantity qp 
* 
not far from pLE 
, ~ L E  - at which point his profits are low. 
* If the long-term marginal costs are lower at the long-term 
equilibrium than the long-term average costs (which is probable 
in the case of natural monopoly), the mechanism of maximizing 
PA does not work sufficiently well close to the long-term equili- 
brium, since it cannot result in a price that is lower than 
average cost. Further modifications of this mechanism, for 
example similar to the mechanism of maximizing pF, are then needed. 
This analysis shows on one hand the difficulties related to 
investment motivation and market equilibration by a monopolistic 
producer, and on the other hand,the analysis also shows the 
effectiveness of price-dependent profit taxation when limiting 
price variations and stimulating short-term efficiency. 
So far we have considered a single producer in deep dis- 
equilibria conditions. If there are several producers of the 
same commodity, in deep disequilibrium,they might have radically 
different technologies and cost curves. The central authority 
should then announce uniform upper and lower guideline prices 
6 and p = y 6 .  Suppose the producers have already disclosed their 
actual cost curves and capacities when maximizing PA. Consider 
the least efficient producer (Fig.3a) and suppose his minimal 
average costs AClmin are higher than 6. He will then charge 
- 
'1 - AClmin in deep disequilibrium, have no profit, but will 
not go bankrupt. He knows that his production is needed only as 
long as other producers do not extend supply sufficiently to 
cover the demand - and he has some time in which to take necessary 
action, change technology, or to think about other production. 
Another producer (Fig.3b) who has minimal average costs ACzmin 
such that (2y-1) @ < ACZmin < @ will choose p2 between y@ = p  
and 6 and have moderate profits. The most efficient producer 
Figure 3. Three producers of the same commodity with widely 
differing costs. 
who has minimal average costs AC3min < (2y-1)s will choose 
p3 = ye = 5 and make very large profits. Observe that an im- 
plicit competition between these producers motivates them to 
invest and expand production. Thus, in the case of more than 
one producer, we have under the proposed mechanism a competitive 
situation even in the deep disequilibrium case, which makes it 
much easier for the central authority to coordinate investments 
and equilibrate the market. However, the central authority has 
another difficulty in this case: the producers charge different 
prices p # p2 # p3 in deep disequilibrium. 1 
Therefore, the central authority might create another agent - 
a distributor. The distributor can have many functions - beside 
averaging prices for the consumer, organizing distribution 
(including rationing), he might be reponsible for setting detailed 
upper and lower guideline prices for many products of the producer, 
having obtained from the central authority only aggregated guide- 
line prices. * 
Consider a situation in which the producer not only has 
multiple products, but also might sell them at differentiated prices, 
and guideline prices might change in time. Thus, consider separate 
transactions - sales of quantity q of some product at a price pk, k 
with a given upper guideline price Fk; we assume only that the 
coefficient y is constant over all transactions, products and time 
(in an accounting period - at least for a year). We define then the 
revenue share yk of a transaction, thecorresponding average cost 
ACk of producing qk, the aggregated price p and guideline price 5 :  
* The distributor might not be needed when the products of the 
producer are sold not to many consumers but to other producers - 
for example, to other divisions of a large corporation in a 
market economy. Observe that this is also a disequilibrium situ- 
ation - other divisions of a corporation would buy at any transfer 
price that is lower than the external market price. However, there 
is no difficulty in this situation when setting the upper guide- 
line price @ - it might be simply the external market price, 
established by the buying division. The center of the corporation 
announces the coefficient y and collects the price-dependent taxes. 
The selling division then charges (in an average transaction, see 
the analysis of many products and transactions) the marginal price. 
t 
and use p and 6 in order to determine the coefficient a(p) and 
its elasticity 
' 
Then, if the producer maximizes his modified 
profit: 
he will choose (see Appendix 3 )  his pk and qk in such a way that: 
and 
Observe that the price aggregation distorts slightly marginal 
**  
pricing; however, this distortion is quite natural. If, in a 
given transaction, he faces a favourably high upper guideline 
k , the ratio pk/gk price 6 such that, if he would set pk = - ?qk 
would be lower than the average ratio p/p, then he can increase 
the coefficient o by increasing the quantity qk. ~quations (28), 
(29) indicate that he should then charge a price pk slightly 
ack lower than - and sell a correspondingly higher quantity q 
aq k' 
Conversely, if Ee faces an unfavourable low upper guideline price 
Gk , say, lower than the minimum of average costs ACk for this 
transaction, he misht forego the transaction at all if he has 
otner choices. In short, in the case of many products and trans- 
actions the producer is slightly more sensitive to setting of guide- 
line prices than it would result from marginal pricing. 
  his 
*This accounting~should be monitored by an independent agent 
- for example, by the bank of the producer, which is consistent 
with the assumption of the role of~banks in the proposals of 
economic reform in Poland. 
* *  In a sense similar to the situation on a market when a 
producer makes a transaction below his marginal costs if the 
sales promotes long-term market expansion or is otherwise favour- 
able to the producer. 
makes it easier for the central authority or the distributor to 
use the guideline prices as an instrument of control and market 
equilibration. 
Consider now the situation, where a single producer faces 
the market constraint without the distributor, only under the 
influence of price-dependent profit taxation, and take, for 
simplicity, the case of one product only. If there is no 
threat of entry of a competitor, he has actually no incentive to 
satisfy market demand in short term, except in case when he has 
already such production capacity that his best solution without 
* 
market exceeds market demand. Since his best solution without 
market - see ( 2 4 1 ,  (25) - is characterized by the cost ratio: 
and E~ - 1 = MC - - - at this solution characterizes AC C 
the rate of (unmodified) profit, he will face market constraints 
and satisfy the demand if the inequality q 5 D(p) becomes binding 
and results in diminishing his rate of profit, cC-1. Thus, the 
market is equilibrated if (see Appendix 3) 
In this case, the producer will charge a price p and produce a 
quantity q resulting from two equations, the market constraint 
q = D(p) and one of two equivalent conditions: 
* This reservation is the same as the one made for the Tam 
mechanism and for the proposed modification of Domar mechanism; 
Eowever, here we consider it in more detail. 
where ~ ~ ( 1  - E ~ )  + E~ 2 0 if (31) holds, thus p - : MC. Marginal 
pricing p = MC is obtained if E~ = &A , which is implied (since 
EA' 1 
- /P  
&A - 1 P p/p , see Appendix 3) by: 
/', 
If the central authority estimates MC wrongly ($is much easier 
A A 
to estimate) and sets 5 > 2MC - AC, then the producer meets 
demand constraint and charges a price p > MC, while the elasticity 
of the index n = with respect to errors in the estimation of 
A MC 
MC, E f l ~ ~ ~ ,  is close to 1. If the central authority sets 
6 > 2MC - AC, then p = MC,. but the produced quantity does 
not satisfy demand. Thus, the price dependent profit taxation, 
while being a good mechanism for deep disequilibria, is not very 
robust at short-term market equilibria. Therefore, after achieving 
equilibrium, it is necessary either to change the motivation 
mechanism - or to use appropriately the services of the distri- 
butor, who was needed in deep disequilibrium but might be also 
used for other purposes in equilibrium. 
6. THE ROLE OF A DISTRIBUTOR IN MARKET EQUILIBRATION 
We assume here that the distributor is a partner of the 
producer, with different but not strictly antagonist motivation, 
* 
and cannot fully collude with the producer. Thus, we assume that 
the distributor buys from the producer at a price p 1 MC(q) - 
resulting, for example, from the price-dependent profit taxation 
motivation mechanism of the producer. If we would give to the 
distributor full monopsomistic and monopolistic powers - the right 
*Thus the distributor cannot have total power over the 
producer. This is guaranteed if the distributor cannot set 
production quota for the producer - although he can set guideline 
prices or even actual prices, and the producer responds then 
either with prices and quantity, or just with quantity. Observe 
that, no matter whether the distributor sets guideline prices or 
actual prices, he cannot buy from the producer at a price lower 
than the marginal production costs (on average - we do not con- 
sider here aggregation effects discussed earlier). However, he 
could buy from the producer at a higher price, while sharing with 
him the effects of the joint monopolistic position. 
to buy all products from producers and sell them on the market 
while maximizing profit - it would be clearly socially dis- 
advantageous.  he distributor would maximize then the expression : 
where p is the price paid to the producer and pC - the consumer 
price. He would choose then a solution where his marginal 
1 d 
revenue, MR = pC(l - -1, equals his marginal outlay, MO = -(pq)= 
€77 dq 
u 
p (1 + E~,), where p = MC, E - C"*q C MC is the elasticity of 
marginal costs. Thus, he would enjoy full effect of both 
monopoly and monopsomy, charging a price pC that is even higher 
than the normal monopolistic price of the producer. However, the 
central authority can choose a different motivation for the 
distributor. For example, he might be allowed to charge only a 
mark-up price pC = (1 + 6) p, where 6 is a markup coefficient 
* 
assumed here to estimate correctly the distribution costs; thus, 
- the ideal price on the market would be achieved if p = MC, pC - 
(1 + 6)MC. Since the profit of the distributor now takes the 
form 
he is actually interested in maximizing revenue. If the demand 
h 
elasticity at the ideal price is gD > 1, then the marginal 
revenue is positive and the distributor can gain more by in- 
creasing quantity than by increasing price. He would buy then 
*This is clearly a simplifying assumption - however, full 
analysis of various aspects of the functioning of a distributor 
cannot be achieved in this paper, since there are many other 
aspects that should be discussed. For example, the distributor 
should not have unlimited monopsomy powers-producers should be 
able to sell directly on the market, and it is possible to devise 
motivation mechanism that promote such behavior. The problems of 
aggregation effects of many transactions and products, of the 
influence of the distributor on the investments of the producer, 
and many others should be also investigated in detail. These 
problems are, however, the subject of another paper. 
at p = MC and a r r i v e  a t  t h e  i d e a l  s o l u t i o n  w i t h o u t  any f u r t h e r  
m o t i v a t i o n ;  t h u s ,  t h e r e  i s  a c t u a l l y  no  need  t o  c o n s t r u c t  s p e c i a l  
A 
m o t i v a t i o n  mechan i sms  f o r  e q u i l i b r i a  s i t u a t i o n s  w i t h  E > 1, 
D 
i f  v e  i n t r o d u c e  a  d i s t r i b u t o r  w i t h  mark-up p r i c i n g  r u l e .  However, 
if ; < 1, the distributor would be interested in increasing D 
price until E = 1, decreasing the quantity sold on the market. D 
He can do it by forming an informal coalition with the producer - 
simply by agreeing to pay to the producer a price p > MC(q) . 
Thus, we need special motivation mechanisms for the distributor 
A 
in equilibria situations with E < 1 ,  as well as for deep D - 
disequilibria. 
As the firstfromsuch motivation mechanism, the central 
authority might choose a price-dependent profit taxation. For 
example, if the profit P6 = 6.p *q is supposed to cover, with 
some margin, the distribution costs, then the part of this profit 
that is used for additional salaries for the distributor 
employees and managers might be proportional to the reward 
function : 
- 
- 
where a(p ) is as in Fig 1, with pC and pC = yFC set by the central 
c* 
authority. Consider the behavior of a distributor who is starting 
in a deep disequilibrium while maximizing P A g  His constraints 
are : 
*In case of many products, central authority could set 
only aggregated upper and lower quideline prices - similarly 
as in the case of setting them for a producer. 
Since 
hence, if > 1 (which is guaranteed if y > 0.5 and 
ybC < pC < bC , see Appendix 4) , he will always choose the minimal 
price at which he can buy, p = MC(q). If the market constraint 
is not yet binding, there are shortages on the market, the 
constraint p = MC(q) results in: 
which implies a disequilibrium solution p,q satisfying two 
equations 
see Fig. 4. 
Figure 4. Market equilibrium under price dependent motivation 
for the distributor: pl,ql -solution in deep dis- 
equilibrium; p2,q2 - resuits of an investment; @,$ - 
resulting ideal (short-term) solution. 
However, the distributor can be also empowered to stimulate 
the investments of the producer. He can, for example, collect for 
this purpose the price-dependent taxes of the producer's profit. 
It can be also reasonably assumed that the distributor knows 
probable demand characteristics and the long-term cost character- 
istics of the producer much better than the central authority 
(he works daily with the market and with the producer). Thus, 
he has information needed for a choice of investments, and he can 
propose investment credit to the producer - if necessarv- using 
the threat of creating a competitor in order to motivate the 
producer. Suppose such an investment has been made and was 
sufficient for covering market demand. The resulting (short-term) 
situation is that the quantity determined by (41), q = MC ( ~ ~ - 1 )  -C" 
is higher than D (MC (1+6) ) , see Fig. 4. Now the best solution for 
the d.istributor is precisely on the intersection of (1+6)MC (q) and 
- 1 D (q) , the ideal short term solution. This is because, if 
MC dPA6 
<(E -1)C" , the derivative dq as defined by (40) is positive 
and the distributor tries to increase the supply as far as 
possible. Such a  s o l u t i o n  - r e s u l t i n g  from an  i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  
two c o n s t r a i n t s  t h a t  a r e  e x t e r n a l  t o  t h e  d i s t r i b u t o r  - i s  f u l l y  
r o b u s t ,  does not depend on parameters of his motivation mechanism 
nor on other information. To see that it does not depend qn 
the demand elasticity we can also check the derivative 
dP,A 
under the reverse assumption that q = D(pC) but 
As long as E > 1, this derivative is positive even for E 0 and A D 
the distributor will try to buy more until he reaches q = MC 
p = MC (q) . 
In long term, the distributor will try to influence the 
producer to lower his marginal costs as far as possible, thus 
* 
trying to achieve the long-term ideal solution. Observe that 
the central authority has only to know the equilibrium price 
A h 
PC up to, say + - 25%, so that ygC < PC < GC with y = 0.6, and 
the motivation of the distributor results in fully robust ideal 
solution. 
Although the mechanism described above is attractive in many 
aspects, the central authority might choose to control sharply 
consumer prices. In such a situation, another motivation mechanism 
might be used. Instead of price-dependent profit modification, we 
assume quantity-dependent (actually, volume-dependent, since 
quantities have to be then aggregated at the centrally set 
consumer prices) profit modification, in a sense dual to the 
modification represented in Fig. 1. The central authority sets 
then an upper guideline quantity 6 and a lower guidelinequantity 
- 
q = oG for the distributor, and his modified profit becomes: 
- 
where B(q), represented in Fig. Sa, is equal zero if q < wG = q, 
- 
- increases linearly for q < q <  q, and is equal to maximal B if 0 
q > G. Its elasticity: 
is decreasing with q, from very high values at q slightly larger 
1 - than q ,  to 1 - w  at q q, then drops down to zero. 
*If, at the ideal long term solution, the long-term marginal 
costs are lower than the long term average costs and the producer 
cannot make profit(which is probable in a natural monopoly case), 
the producer has to obtain special motivation - a subsidy similar 
as in the linear taxation mechanism. Such a subsidy would have to 
be negotiated with the central authority. 
Mc 1 
nvestments 
I 
Figure 5. a)Quantity-dependent profit modification coefficient 
B(q) and its elasticity E (q) ; b) Market equilibration 
under quantity-dependent Wotivation for the distributor. 
If we analyze the behavior of the distributor under such 
motivation mechanisms, with the constraints 
where 6 is a sharply set upper-bound for consumer prices, we can C 
see that he will rise the price to pC = sC, as long as he does 
not encounter the demand constraint. However, being quantity - 
motivated, he will pay to the producer p = MC(q) , and try to 
induce the producer to invest. After investments, when the 
demand constraint is met, he will lower the price to $ = 
- 1 C (1+6) MC ($) = D ( 6 )  , the ideal price. This is because the 
dPE6 1 -1 derivative - dq , if p = D (q), has the form 
1 and is positive as long as E +1 > -  , which can be achieved for 
B 
a low ED ED > 0.2) by a proper choice of w (say, 
h 
w - > 0.75). However, the ideal quantity q has then to be 
estimated more precisely than the ideal price $ under the 
price-dependent mechanism. 
CONCLUSIONS 
While the motivation mechanisms for a monopolistic producer, 
designed for market equilibrium cases and known from various 
publications, can be further improved and made more robust, they 
are not really implementable because of their deficiencies in 
deep disequilibria cases, or not quite clear motivation to reach 
long-term equilibrium. For deep disequilibria, special mechanisms 
promoting the disclosure of hidden reserves can be devised; 
however, they are not very robust in equilibrium situations. To 
improve this, another agent - a distributor, empowered to promote 
investments by the producer - can be introduced and appropriately 
motivated. A system composed of a monopolistic producer motivated 
for deep disequilibria cases and separated from the market by a 
distributor, can work both in disequilibria and equilibria cases, 
result in robust marginal prices, and evolve towards long-term 
competitive equilibrium. 
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APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX 1 .  ROBUSTNESS OF MOTIVATION MECHANISMS 
E D The Domar mechanism t h a t  maximizes PD = - 8,- 1 qp - C under  
U 
marke t  c o n s t r a i n t  p = D-l (q) r e s u l t s  i n  a s o l u t i o n :  
- 
w h e r e '  i s  a n  estimate o f  demand e l a s t i c i t y ,  - ED - a c t u a l  demand 
n cn (€--I 1 
= - U U e l a s t i c i t y .  Thus,  i f  rD = - - MC - , w e  have  ( ~ ~ - 1 )  
h 
where cD i s  t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  a t  t h e  i d e a l  s o l u t i o n .  Observe  t h e  
symmetry o f  t h e  dependence of rrd on E and E D ,  which i s  a  mani- D 
f e s t i a t i o n  o f  more g e n e r a l  r e l a t i v i t y  p r i n c i p l e s  i n  s e n s i t i v i t y  
a n a l y s i s .  The F r e i x a s  mechanism t h a t  maximizes PF = ( p + t ) q - ~ ,  
- 
t - under market  c o n s t r a i n t  p  = D-' ( q )  r e s u l t s  i n  a  s o l u t i o n  
& D  
where MC i s  an e s t i m a t e  of  t h e  i d e a l  p r i c e  9 = M c^. Thus, 
E - 
p  - t 
'IT = 1  - -  . However, MC depends on E ;  w e  can  l i n e a r -  F  = - cD-1 MC 
i z e  t h i s  dependence by o b s e r v i n g  t h a t  (A1.3) can  be  w r i t t e n  
p  + q  * + f = MC and by u s i n g  t h e  i m p l i c i t  f u n c t i o n  theorem. T h i s  
dq 
i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  l i n e a r i z i n g  t h i s  e q u a t i o n  f o r  s m a l l  d e v i a t i o n s  
A 
of p , q , Z  from s t $  and f = 8 = - A* which r e s u l t s  i n  
D qdq ' 
where C" = . Thus 
dq 
a~ - E D a T ~  E D f  F  - S i n c e  - - - - (cD-l)MC 2 t h u s  a: a MC (cD-l)MC 
Clearly, ETED - dE - - dF m -  1 ,  -  0 - - -  - -- I - - E~~~ d z  - d% t t 
hence the elasticities of aF with respect to ED and E have the 
same form as (A1.5). 
The Tam mechanism that maximizes PT = (q-q)p - C  should be 
considered, actually, under the inequality market constraint 
P 2 D-' (q) or q - < D (p) since this constraint might not be active 
at the maximum of PT. If q > q and thus D-' ( 6 )  < MC (;) , we would 
have - < 0, hence q should be decreased start- 
q =-qtp D-' (;) aPT I 
ing from q ;  but if q < q ,  then - < 0 and p should also be 
ap 
decreased - thus the constraint p < D-' (q) cannot be active. How- 
- 
ever, we can analyze the robustness of Tam mechanism under the 
assumption that 4 - < $ which results in the activity of market 
-1 
constraint, p = D  (q), or just assume that other motivations 
- 1 (survival of the firm, etc.) would result in p = D  (q) even if 
- 
q > $  . Under this simplifying assumption we obtain: 
p - and aT = - - &D MC . Similar to (A1 .3) , here we have to ' +P/q 
approximate the dependence of q on q. Since (A1.6) can be 
dp 
-*, we use the implicit function written as MC = p + q~ - 
qdq 
theorem or, equivalently, linearize this equation for small 
- 
deviations from q = q = $, MC = p = @ which yields 
Now 
if C" or E are sufficiently small. However, the quideline D 
d * ~  g 1 +C " P D$/p 
quantity 6 has somehow to be estimated . Suppose the demand has 
which results in 
%I * T  
-e 
- 1 a simple constant elasticity form, p = D (q) = B(q/e) and 
= - 1. = 
- - 2cD I+O.SC"E~$/G 
consider what deviation q - 4  = q - 6  would be caused by setting 
q=q=$,ED=eD 
- 
p = M C  # 6 or ED # eD. By implicit function theorem, we then 
obtain 
which implies 
eD$ - 
- 
- 
9 and -- 
P 
= 0, 
- h q=$, cD=cD 
APPENDIX 2. A MODIFIED ROBUST MOTIVATION MECHANISM 
Consider the modified Domar mechanism with PW = zqp-C, 
- - 
where z is a function of E -  = m  and actual price p. Although, DIP 
generally, p - < D-' (q) should be considered as the market con- 
- 1 
straint, assume p = D  (q) for initial analysis. Then 
1 - 
where = - E . Postulate z (1- ( ) = 1 for = E 
dp z D D 
- dz 
and for all p. Since this can be rewritten as z(ED-1) - E =-  D dp 
we obtain a differential equation: 
1 If we also postulate Z ( I - ~  (l-cZ) = 1 for all cD and for p = p = E ,  
D 
we obtain E = 1 and z = 1 for all E~ and p=p. Thus, the differ- z 
ential equation (A2.2) has a boundary condition: 
When solving (A2.2) with (A2.3) for two cases # 1 and E = 1, D 
the following solutions are obtained: 
Observe that if p/p<l, then ~ ~ < 1 ,  and if p/p>l, then 
E > 1 .  Now, if we define  IT^ = P Z Kc we have 
However, both z and E~ depend on ~ / p  = riw y, where =MC/~. 
Taking this into account and combining (A2.4) , (A2.5) , (A2.6) 
- 
we obtain (at FD # 1, cD # 1 ;  for cD = 1, a similar analysis 
applies) 
a. 
By the implicit function theorem, is the solution of an ay 
equation obtained by the differentiation of (A2.7) in y: 
aTw - 
which implies -= 0 for E~ = E all y. Taking this into 
Y D' 
account and differentiating (A2.8) once more, we also obtain 
2 a T W 
- =  0 for ED = E all y - and we really do not need to do 
ay2 
D' 
- 
it, since we have actually postulated  IT^ = 1 at cD = E ~ ,  all y 
- anrw 
and r = 1 at y = 1, all ED - thus all derivatives - = 0 W 
n ayn 
- 
- a"rw 
at E~ = E and all derivatives - D = 0 at y = 1. However, aEn 
D a2r 
( A 2 . 8 )  can be used to derive the mixed derivative w . 
aEDay ' 
by differentiating ( A 2 . 8 )  with respect to FD, taking into 
account that other derivatives are zero, we obtain 
which results in 
Thus, for example, 2 0 %  changes of both ED as compared to ED 
and = p as compared to MC would result, at first approximation, 
in only 4 %  change of rw. However, this is only a local estimate 
and it is necessary to check its validity for larger changes of 
- - 
EDtP This can be done by solving ( A 2 . 7 )  . While ( A 2 . 7 )  can 
be solved only numerically for a general case of any positive ZD, 
there are three cases when it take a more simple form. If 
- 
E = 0.5, we obtain a quadratic equation with respect to x = r W  0.5 D 
with the positive solution: 
and can check the robustness of the mechanism by constructing a 
table : 
W e  observe  t h a t  i f ,  i n d eed ,  changes of  TD and a r e  n o t  more 
than  20% o r  even 30%,  t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  (A2.9) g i v e s  r e a s o n a b l e  
- 
e s t i m a t e s  of  t h e  changes o f  nW. I f  cD = 1 ,  t h e n  (A2.7) becomes: 
which, though a  s i m p l e r  e q u a t i o n ,  s t i l l  have t o  be so lved  
n u m e r i ca l l y .  A s i m i l a r  t a b l e  a s  p r e s e n t e d  above ha s  been con- 
s t r u c t e d  and conf i rms  t h e  conc lu s ions  on t h e  v a l i d i t y  of t h e  
approximat ion o f  IT by t h e  e l a s t i c i t y  (A2.9) .  The same q u a l i -  W 
t a t i v e  r e s u l t  was o b t a i n e d  by c o n s t r u c t i n g  a  cor responding  t a b l e  
f o r  ED = 2 ,  i n  which c a s e  (A2.7) i s  a  q u a d r a t i c  e q u a t i o n  i n  ITW 
w i t h  t h e  p o s i t i v e  s o l u t i o n :  
There is no reason to check the robustness of nW for higher D ' 
- 
say, E~ = 5, since then the unmodified Domar mechanism is reason- 
ably robust. 
The above analysis also shows that there is no necessity to 
adjust E too precisely in the modified Domar mechanism. One D 
- 
E is roughly estimated, the guideline price p = MC can be used D 
as the main parameter of the mechanism. The way of an iterative 
correction of p under the assumption of constant MC has been 
discussed in Section 3. If MC are not constant, we must know 
dMC 
an estimate of C" = -
dq 
C"'Q to construct an or of EC, = - MC 
iterative correction of p. Suppose we take the simplest 
approximation of demand by assuming constant elasticity E~ and 
define x = 4 - 1 = - 4 E ( R  -1). Now we would like to compute D ?? 
such x that 
which results in 
Jointly, these two equations give a quadratic equation in x, 
with the solution ' 
The other solution of this quadratic equation does not satisfy 
the requirement that x be negative if nw > 1. Here, n = W MC 
cannot really be observed, only estimated from (A2.6), 
since z and E~ can be computed from observed data, and we are 
supposed to know approximate E D' Knowing x, we next choose p t+l 
to approximate @ = MC (1 +E x) : C ' 
Since we might be uncertain about true values of E D rE~min'E~max 1 
EC1 E [ E ~ I ~ ~ ~ ; E ~ I ~ ~ ~  I , we would have to compute IT W,t and Pt+l/Pt 
under various assumptions concerning E and E ~ ,  and then choose D 
the most conservative estimate of Pt+l/Pt. Nevertheless, the 
information obtained that way might still be valuable for iter- 
ative corrections of 5. For example, suppose true parameters 
were cC, = 1.5, cD = 0.8, IT W,t = 1.21, M C ~ / P ~  = 1.4, but we do 
not know them. We have used ED = 1.0 and, after choosing some 
- 
pt, have observed Pt/Ft = 1.69, z = 0.537, cZ = 1.428. If true 
- 
parameters were known, we would compute Ptcl/pt = 1.552 and 
- 
obtain pt+, = @. However, suppose we only know that E~ E [O. 4; 1.21 
and E E [1.0;2.0]. We can them compute four different estimates C ' 
of Pt+l/Pt = 1.458; 1.530; 1.790; 1.823. When using the most 
- 
conservative estimate pt+l/pt = 1.458, we finally obtain IT W,t+l - 
1.036, a reasonable result with such uncertain data. 
Thus, the modified Domar mechanism has many desirable theoretical 
properties: it is robust and can be interatively corrected even 
with uncertain data. However, this does not mean that this is a 
really implementable mechanism. Besides questions of long-term 
motivation, of price aggregation, etc., that are not discussed 
here, the mechanism has also a theoretical drawback, the same 
as the Tam mechanism, that it does not promote market equilibration 
i f  p < $ .  I n  f a c t ,  cons ide r  t h e  market c o n s t r a i n t  i n  t h e  form 
- 1 D-l ( q )  and l e t  p < 3 = D ( 4 ) .  The f  i r s t - o r d e r  d e r i v a t i v e s  
- 
of  PW a t  p  = p  a r e  
Thus, t h e  producer  can behave i n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  a s  i f  t h e  p r i c e  
- p were c e n t r a l l y  s e t ,  t h a t  i s ,  choose p  = p  and q  = 4 such t h a t  
- 
M C ( ~ )  = p,  a s  long a s  t h i s  q < D ( 6 )  - which happens p r e c i s e l y  i f  
- 
- 1 - 
p  < 3 = D (8)  , implying q = MC-l ( p )  < MC-I ( 3 )  = $ = D ( @ )  < D(p) 
under t h e  assumption of l o c a l l y  i n v e r t i b l e ,  r i s i n g  marginal  c o s t .  
This  a l s o  shows t h a t  i n  deep d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  - t h e  modif ied 
Domar mechanism i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  c e n t r a l  p r i c e  s e t t i n g .  I n  t h e  
ca se  of a  very low market e l a s t i c i t y ,  when E + O  and q  = D(p) D 
i s  approximately c o n s t a n t ,  it i s  easy t o  s e e  from ( A 2 . 4 )  t h a t  
z + t h u s  PW + pq - C - aga in  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  c e n t r a l  p r i c e  
s e t t i n g  of p. The on ly  d i f f e r e n c e  between deep d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  and 
i n e l a s t i c  demand i s  t h a t  t h e  producer i s  assumed t o  meet t h e  
demand i n  t h e  l a t t e r  ca se .  
APPENDIX 3 .  PRICE-DEPENDENT TAXATION MECHANISM FOR DEEP 
DISEQUILIBRIA 
I f  t h e  reward f u n c t i o n  ( o r  t h e  a c t u a l  p r o f i t  remaining wi th  t h e  
producer  a f t e r  t a x a t i o n )  i s  PA = a(pq-C) ,  where a i s  a  f u n c t i o n  
da E > 0 ,  and i f  p  < D-l (q) , t h e  market  c o n s t r a i n t  of p  and = - -dp a -  
i s  n o t  a c t i v e ,  t hen  
and 
where 
and 
( A 3 . 4 )  - 0 * p = MC - -  
aq 
Now,  suppose a ( p )  h as  t h e  form g iven  i n  F ig .1 .  Thus 
- 
i f  P L P  = Y @  
- ( A 3 . 5 )  i f  YG = p < p < c  
-. 
i f  P L P  
and 
o i f  p < P  = Y G  
( A 3 . 6 )  i f  y j j  = p < p < c  
-. i f  P I P  
Y Observe t h a t  a t  p = 5 = y $  i n c r e a s e s  from zero t o  - and 
-. 
1 -Y 
1 t h a t  i f  p .  Moreovert 1 - - =  2  - g i f  P < p < @ .  
E A  P  
-. 
Thus ( A 3 . 2 )  and ( A 3 . 4 )  y i e l d  p ( 2 - E )  = 2 p  - jj = AC w i t h  p = MC, 
which r e s u l t s  i n  
This  s imple  r e s u l t  g i v e s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of an easy e s t ima t ion  
of MC = p and AC = 2p--5 once 5 i s  c e n t r a l l y  s e t  and p  i s  ob- 
served.  Moreover, suppose ACmin > ( 2 y - 1 ) F ;  then  
1 - 
~(Ac+:) 2  > - 2(ACmin+5) > y 5 ,  and p  > yg = p. C l e a r l y  ACmin< 6 
r e s u l t s  i n  MC = p < g .  Thus; 
Therefore ,  by choosing,  s a y ,  y=0 .6  we admit  a  wide range of un- 
c e r t a i n t y  f o r  ACmin: it can change between 0.26 and 6,  s t i l l  
r e s u l t i n g  i n  p  between 0 . 6 5  and 6. I f  w e  choose y = 0.5,  we 
- 
even have 0 <ACmin < 5 
=) p < p < 6. Thus, when int roducir ig  p r i c e -  
dependent p r o f i t  t a x a t i o n  wi thout  much in format ion  about  c o s t  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  it i s  b e s t  t o  choose y e q u a l  o r  c l o s e  t o  0.5 
and 5 obviously  n o t  sma l l e r  than ACmin ( f o r  example , 'on t h e  l e v e l  
of  r e c e n t l y  r e p o r t e d  average c o s t s ) .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, (A3.7) d e f i n e s  how f a r  t h e  a c t u a l  produced 
q u a n t i t y  q  exceeds t h e  op t imal  c o s t  c a p a c i t y  qo  de f ined  by 
(A3.9) min AC (q )  = AC (qO ) = ACmin 
9 
I n  o r d e r  t o  approximate t h e  q u a n t i t y  q ,  assume s imple  q u a d r a t i c  
approximation of p roduc t ion  c o s t  around q  0 
which r e s u l t s  i n  approximations of average and maximal c o s t s  
1 C; (A3.11) MC = C;) + C: (q-qO) ; AC = C i  + - -(q-qO) 2 
90 
where C;) = ACmin = co/q0.  S u b s t i t u t i n g  (A3.11) by (A3.7) w e  
o b t a i n  a  q u a d r a t i c  e q u a t i o n  f o r  (q-q ) and choose a  s o l u t i o n  o f  0  
t h i s  e q u a t i o n  t h a t  s a t i s f i e s  q  - 90 = 0  i f  5 = ACmin 
T h i s ,  i f  t h e  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  e l a s t i c i t y  E is ,  f o r  example, e q u a l  C ' 
t o  1 ,  t h e n  5 = 3ACmin y i e l d s  q  = 3 q 0  For s m a l l e r  ~ / A c ~ ~ ~ ~  a  
more r e a l i s t i c  approx imat ion  of  (A3.12) i s  
Both (A3.12) and (A3.13) ho ld  i f  6 - > A C m i n t  implying q  - > qo .  I f  
$ < A C m i n t  s i n c e  i s  n o t  d e f i n e d  a t  p > P ,  - t h e  p roducer  cou ld  
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  choose any p r i c e  and any produced quantity. However, 
w e  assume t h a t  he w i l l  behave r a t i o n a l l y  and t r y  t o  minimize h i s  
average  c o s t s  i n  o r d e r  t o  check whether  a  p r o f i t a b l e  p roduc t i on  
i s  a t  a l l  p o s s i b l e ;  t h i s  r e s u l t s  i n  q = q o  and p =  ACmin i f  
P < ACmin (which co u l d  be  fo rma l ly  o b t a i n e d  by a d d i t i o n a l l y  de- 
1  f i n i n g  = + m and 1  - - - 1  f o r  p  > @ ,  see F i g . 2 , 3 ) .  
€A 
T h e r e f o r e ,  i f  t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  p roduce r s  w i t h  wide ly  d i f f e r e n t  
p r o d u c t i on  c o s t s  and s u b j e c t  t o  uniform pr ice -dependen t  p r o f i t  
t a x a t i o n ,  w i t h  t h e  same $ and p = y e ,  t h e n  t h e i r  p r o f i t s  w i l l  
be s h a r p l y  l i m i t e d  by t h e  t a x a t i o n  mechanisms. The l e a s t  
> $  w i l l  charge  t h e  p r i c e  p l  = AClmin e f f i c i e n t  w i t h  AClmin-  and 
have no p r o f i t .  The more e f f i c i e n t  w i t h  (2y - I )$  <ACZmin  < 6 w i l l  
charge  a  p r i c e  p2 t h a t  can  be determined by combining (A3.11) 
and (A3.13) : 
and will produce a quantity 
while his profit remaining after taxation can be estimated by: 
and the corresponding profit rate P A ~ / A C ~ ~ ~  by: 
This is illustrated by the following table (with Y = 0.5, a. = 1): 
Even i f ,  f o r  example,  @ i s  3  t i m e s  l a r g e r  t han  AC , r l  = 0.333, 
min 
t h e  p roducer  ch a r g e s  t h e  p r i c e  p  on ly  tw ice  ACmin, and has  a  
remaining p r o f i t  r a t e  of  6 6 . 7 %  - i n s t e a d  o f  cha rg ing  t h e  p r i c e  
p  = @ and having 200% p r o f i t  r a t e ,  which would be  o b t a i n e d  i n  
t h i s  c a s e  i f  p  = @ were c e n t r a l l y  set .  The above r e s u l t s  a r e  
approximate ;  more p r e c i s e  r e s u l t s  can be o b t a i n e d  by u s i n g  
(A3.12) i n s t e a d  o f  (A3.13) , which l i m i t s  t h e  p r o f i t  r a t e s  of  
t h e  p roducer  even more s t r o n g l y .  
I f  y  > 0 . 5 ,  t h en  it might happen t h a t  some producer  would have 
AC3min < (2y-1)@ and ch a r g e  t h e  p r i c e  p  = y@ = i, t h u s  keeping 
t h e  l a r g e s t  p a r t  of  p r o f i t  a. t o  h i m s e l f .  I n  any c a s e ,  t h e  
above examples show t h a t  t h e  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  can i n f l u e n c e  
p roducer  b eh av i o r  by choosing an upper  g u i d e l i n e  p r i c e  @ - b u t  
t h i s  i n f l u e n c e  i s  much s o f t e r  and more r o b u s t  t h a n  when s imply  
c e n t r a l l y  s e t t i n g  t h e  p r i c e  @. 
Consider  now a  c a s e  o f  v a r i o u s  t r a n s a c t i o n s  and p r o d u c t s  of 
a  s i n g l e  p roducer .  Suppose t h a t ,  i n  a  s i n g l e  t r a n s a c t i o n ,  he 
sells  a  q u a n t i t y  qk o f  a  p roduc t  a t  a  p r i c e  pk,  w h i l e  t h e  upper 
g u i d e l i n e  p r i c e  f o r  t h i s  p roduc t  and t r a n s a c t i o n  was e s t a b l i s h e d  
a t  ek. Consider  f i r s t  a  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which t h e  q u a n t i t y  qk was 
e x t e r n a l l y  f i x e d  and suppose t h e  p roducer  chooses  pk i n  o r d e r  
t o  maximize 
where a ( p )  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  i n  (A3.5) w i t h  p  be ing  some f u n c t i o n  
of  pk (and 5 - of  g k ) .  Then t h e  c o n d i t i o n  
can be t rans formed  t o  
where 
Observe t h a t  yk i s  t h e  revenue s h a r e  of  t h e  k- th  t r a n s a c t i o n  
and ACk i s  t h e  average  c o s t  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  k- th  t r a n s a c t i o n  
through t h i s  revenue s h a r e .  To o b t a i n  t h e  same r e s u l t  a s  i n  
(A3.2) w e  would have t o  d e f i n e  t h e  dependence of  p  on pk i n  
such a  way t h a t  E = yk. But t h i s  i s  o b t a i n e d  by t h e  most 
Pk 
n a t u r a l  way of  p r i c e  agg rega t i on :  
M 
Since  t hen  * = qk/ L qm and E = y k f  which r e s u l t s  i n :  
apk m= 1 Pk 
which i s  e a s i l y  shown t o  be e q u i v a l e n t  t o :  
I f  t h e  p roducer ,  i n  deep d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s ,  can a l s o  
i n f l u e n c e  t h e  q u a n t i t i e s  qk which he se l l s ,  he w i l l  choose them. 
aPA - t o  s a t i s f y  -- 0.  T h i s ,  i f  a ( p )  d i d  n o t  depend on q k ,  would 
aqk.  
ac r e s u l t  i n  pk = - , t h a t  i s  i n  i d e a l  marg ina l  p r i c i n g .  However, 
aqk 
p/p a s  aggrega ted  by (A3.22) does n o t  depend on qk on ly  i f  
pk/Gk = P / G ,  t h a t  i s ,  i f  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  l e v e l  of  t h e  k- th  
t r a n s a c t i o n  c o i n c i d e s  w i th  t h e  average p r i c e  l e v e l .  
I n  a  more g e n e r a l  c a s e  we have 
Thus, i f  pk/gk < p/a , an i n c r e a s e  of q  f  avourab ly  i n £  luence  k  
( i n c r e a s e  i t ,  s i n c e  it d e c r e a s e s  p / p ) .  I n  o t h e r  words, i f  t h e  
producer  i s  o f f e r e d  a t  t h e  k- th  t r a n s a c t i o n  a  favourab ly  h igh  
upper g u i d e l i n e  p r i c e  ek, he  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  t h e  q u a n t i t y  qk and 
ac , change t h e  p r i c e  pk when compared t o  t h e  marg ina l  p r i c e  - 
aqk 
wh i l e  keeping t o  t h e  average  p r i c i n g  r u l e  (A3.23) . To de te rmine  
how f a r  he w i l l  d i s t o r t  t h e  marg ina l  p r i c i n g  r u l e ,  w e  compute: 
which can be so lved  ( s i n c e  
.- M M ACk 1 M P  d n . p _ =  - 
- L pmgm-C)  = 1 Pmqm ( 1  --I = - L emqm and -- 
m=l m= 1 Pk A m=l € dp a  €A)  
t o  o b t a i n  
ac Thus, t h e  producer  sh o u l d  i n c r e a s e  MCk has  t h e  
same p r o p o r t i o n  t o  gk a s  p ha s  t o  
A 
has  t h e  form (A3.6) ,  hence pk can be de te rmined  from (A3.23) a s  
where 
The above e q u a t i o n s  sh o u l d  be i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  f o l l ows .  The 
producer  e x p e c t s  average  p r i c e  p , @  and t o t a l  c o s t s  C,AC.  I f  
he  has  t o  de te rmine  t h e  q u a n t i t y  qk and t h e  p r i c e  pk f o r  a  
t r a n s a c t i o n  w i t h  a  g i v e n  ek, he de te rmines  f i r s t  t h e  q u a n t i t y  qk 
such t h a t  MCk(qk) = Fk and sets ,  a s  a  f i r s t  approx imat ion ,  
P 
Pk = MCk (qk)  H e  can t h e n  check t h e  average  c o s t  r e l a t e d  t o  
t h i s  t r a n s a c t i o n ,  ACk, and compare it t o  gk. I f  n k  = ACk/gk 
t u r n s  o u t  t o  be s m a l l e r  t h a n  11 =AC/p, t h e n  he  knows t h a t  6 k  < 0 ,  
pk can be set  s m a l l e r  t h a n  MCk and t h u s  f avou rab ly  i n f l u e n c e  
t h e  r a t i o  p/g. C l e a r l y ,  t h i s  i s  on ly  t h e  f i r s t  approximat ion:  
such a p r o c e s s  sh o u l d  be i t e r a t i v e l y  r e p e a t e d ,  t h e  expec t ed  p r i c e  
p shou ld  be a d j u s t e d  and t h u s  t h e  q u a n t i t y  qk changed,  etc.  
However, w e  do n o t  d i s c u s s  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  f u l l y  h e r e ,  a s  a  
f u l l  a n a l y s i s  would r e q u i r e  assumpt ions  abou t  how t h e  expec ta -  
t i o n s  o f  t h e  p roducer  r e g a r d i n g  p r i c e s  - i n  p a r t i c u l a r  g u i d e l i n e  
p r i c e s  gt - a r e  formed. 
Now c o n s i d e r  a g a i n  t h e  p r ice -dependen t  t a x a t i o n  PA = a ( p ) - ( p q - C ) ,  
w i t h  one p roducer  and one p r o d u c t ,  b u t  w i t h  p o s s i b l e  market  con- 
s t r a i n t ,  q  < D ( p ) .  The Lagrange f u n c t i o n  L = a(pq-C) +X(D-q) ha s  
- 
s t a t i o n a r y  p o i n t s  i n  p and q ,  i f  
The f i r s t  c o n d i t i o n  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  X - > 0  o n l y  i f  
and o n l y  under  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  can  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  q - < D(p)  be  
a c t i v e .  I f  q  < D ( p ) ,  t h e n  X = 0  and p  = MC. The second con- 
d i t i o n  r e s u l t s  i n :  
which ,  w i t h  = E c a n  be r e w r i t t e n  i n  two e q u i v a l e n t  forms : C ' 
Observe t h a t  p  - > M C  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  E A ( l - ~ C )  + E C ) O ,  0': 
€ A  (A3.34) & < - C - E  A -1 
S i n c e  w e  have = 1  -PI$ - A ; w e  o b t a i n  , t h u s  -~ ~ - 1  2p-p 
- &A 
'c-EA-1 , f3 = M^C i f  2 @ - T  = A ? ,  o r :  
I f  $ i s  s e t  wrong ly ,  f3 > ~ M c  - c , t h e n  M^ C > ? = B  M^c C Thus,  2 k - 6  AC 
h 
p  = MC w i l l  n o t  be  c h o s e n ,  because  t h e n  (1-BC) + E C  > 0  and 
h 
p > k .  I£ $ < ~ M c  - A^C, t h e n  MC < P C ,  which would i n d i c a t e  
2 ~ t - 6  
p  < M^C; b u t  t h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  market  c o n s t r a i n t  w i l l  n o t  b e  
A 
active, X = O  amd some p = MC MC will be chosen without producing 
a quantity that equilibrates the market. 
A A 
Suppose p 12MC - AC and consider the robustness of the price ratio: 
a~ E 1 E We then have A - A .  - -  - 5 n~ E +E -1 at - 3 resulting in A D C 
Moreover, a E ~  . = 1 a!P/@T 1 -P/P . To simplify analysis, assume A 
E > >  E ~ ;  then (A3.33) becomes p (cA-1) E ~ A C  or AC = ~ ~ - 6 ,  A 
1 p a 7 ( 6 + ~ ~ )  with a(~/6) .L = - - Thus we obtain 
a~ PIP 2~ 
(A. 37) 
A 
a5 2e * . M C =  Since -7 = 2 and A 
. 
~ 2 ,  if fC=l. we see that 
a MC aMc P 2e-1 C 
if eC is not too far from 1. Thus the price dependent profit 
taxation mechanism is not very robust, if the market constraint 
is active. 
APPENDIX 4. MOTIVATION MECHANISMS FOR A DISTRIBUTOR 
First consider a distributor buying from several producers. No 
matter whether he sets the buying price pB, or upper and lower 
guideline prices for a profit taxation mechanism, he will buy 
quantities q; resulting from 
Hence his total outlay is 
dqi 1 dMCi (qi) 
- 1 -  Let q = lqi: then * = 1 -  C ; , where Ci = i dpB i dpB i 
1 -1 dpB - Denote 5'' = (1 T, ) : then - - dq C". The marginal outlay of i 1 
the distributor is: 
- 
where E: - does not depend on the number of producers, only C' MCi. 
on the distribution of their production costs; if all producers 
have the same cost curves, then cCt = is the elasticity of MC 
marginal costs. It can easily be seen that, for typical cost 
2C(O) < 2. curves, E z- C' C(qo) 
If the distributor has full monopoly and monopsomy power, he 
-1 
will maximize (pc- pB) q on a market with pC = D (q) , which re- 
sults in 
with pC >>pg = MC. However, we can limit the power of the 
distributor by allowing him to charge only mark-up prices, 
PC = (1+6)p,, where 6 is a given coefficient (approximating 
distribution costs). His profit then takes the form (we 
denote p = p for simplicity) : B 
and his behavior (under market constraint p + D-' (q)) is de- 
termined by the derivative: 
- 1 If E~ > l  for all p = D (q), then the distributor is motivated 
to increase q as far as possible. Thus, he will buy at the 
- 1 lowest price p = MC(q) which, together with p = D (q), deter- 
mines the maximal q - at the ideal short-term market equilibrium. 
- 1 If E~ - < 1 for some p = D (q) , p > MC(q) , the distributor will 
choose the price p and quantity q which result in cD=lt MR=O - 
even if he then has to pay the producer price p higher than 
MC (q) . 
Thus, consider a reward function for the distributor in the form 
where a has the same form as in Appendix 3. Here we consider the 
-1 
market constraint in the form pC - < D  (q) and the buying constraint 
in the form p,MC(q) , in order to check whether the reward func- 
tion (A4.7) promotes market equilibration. 
Since 
da pC/Gc 
where = - - - > l  if y > 0.5 (since E - 
a A-% with dpc 
p(eC >y), hence the distributor is motivated to increase q and 
decrease p. By doing this, he first meets the buying constraint 
p = MC(q); we assume that the marginal costs (in short-term) are 
rising with q. This constraint results in 
If the production capacities are too low to satisfy market de- 
dPA6 
mand and - 
dq 
becomes zero at some q < D(p ) ,  then the distributor C 
chooses a disequilibrium solution: 
However, he is still motivated to increase q if he can achieve 
this by promoting investments and thus lower marginal costs. 
If the production capacities are already sufficient for market 
equilibration and (A4.9) stays positive until q = D(pC), he 
will choose the ideal solution pC = (1+6)MC, q = D(pC), no matter 
what the parameters of his profit taxation mechanism are (as 
long as (2y-l)eC <pC<@Ct see Appendix 3). This can be shown in 
various ways; the simplest one is to compute the derivative 
-1 dPA6 under the constraint pC = ( 1+6) p = D (q) , without the con- 
dq 
straint p = MC(q) : 
if E > 1 .  Thus, under a given pair p A C,q on the market, the 
distributor is motivated to increase q and decrease p until he C 
reaches p = (1+6 ) MC (q) . C 
If the central authority sets the consumer price sharply by 
-, 
pCIpC, but uses volume-dependent taxation to establish the 
distributor motivation: 
with 
and 
- 
undefined , S'S = 4 
(A .  14) 
3PBg 
then - = 6.6-q > 0, the distributor increases p = (1+6)p to 
3~ C 
6, and 
the distributor increaees the volume until he meets the buying 
-, 
PC 
constraint, MC(q) I p  ==, or the market constraint q - < D(pC). 
If the buying constraint is met first, a disequilibrium solution 
- 
q = MC-I Pc)is obtained: but the distributor is motivated to (lis 
promote investments and equilibriate the market. If the market 
constraint is met first, then: 
dq 
" > 0 for all hence if we choose w = 0.75, ~ ~ 2 4 ,  we have -
E ~ >  0.2. Under these conditions, market constraint will result 
in further increase of q and decrease of pC until the buying 
- PC constraint, MC(q) c p  - is attained. This corresponds again 
to a locally fully robust ideal equilibrium solution. 
